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GERM-LINE ENGINEERING:
A FEW EUROPEAN VOICES
ABSTRACT. We have surveyed various recent European opinions on germ-line
engineering. The majority express more or less severe reservations about any
interventions on the human germ-line, including therapeutic ones. However,
they are divided over the pragmatic, or categorical-ethical nature of the relevant
arguments. This split reflects two competing views of technology. The
'pessimistic' one is deeply concerned by the slippery slope leading from bona fide
therapeutic applications of genetic engineering to eugenic practices. It insists
that, if anything can defend us against these evils, it must be a set of strong,
ethically-based prohibitions. The other, 'optimist' view is more confident in the
discriminating powers of societal regulation. We argue for the latter view and
suggest that the pragmatic arguments brought to this debate are less problematic
than the ethical ones.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, the problems of genetic engineering and its
introduction into human medicine have been debated as hotly in
Europe as in North America. As regards these issues - as well as
bioethical problems generally - it is easy to identify in Europe two
contrasting attitudes. One could be termed 'pessimistic7. Its
hallmarks are a very skeptical attitude towards the potential
benefits of the new technologies, a great sensitivity to their poten-
tial evils and, even more characteristically, a tendency to interpret
these evils quite broadly. Proponents of this view generally
advocate sweeping prohibitions or severe regulation of various
genetic technologies, while at the same time expressing doubts
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that sufficiently defensive regulation can really be achieved.
Theirs is a view of technology where intended good and unin-
tended evil, innocent experimentation and large-scale catastrophic
consequences are connected by a tight network of 'slippery
slopes'. Although by no means absent elsewhere, this attitude
seems particularly prevalent in the bioethical literature from
German-speaking countries, where it has crystallized into a kind
of conventional wisdom. The other world-view is an 'optimism7
that is much harder to delineate with any precision: suffice it to
say that Anglo-Saxon and Latin lands, however much they differ
in their legal traditions, seem as a rule more confident in their
ethico-legal capability to promote good and prevent evil without,
as it were, throwing the baby with the bathwater.
In Switzerland, with its unique cohabitation of German and
Romance cultures, these two world views must come to terms
with each other. We have observed (Bourrit et ah, 1989) how they
interacted when the Federal Expert Commission for Human Genetics
and Reproductive Medicine published the Amstad Report (1988), a
document containing a wide range of proposals for the regulation
of various procedures both in human genetics (diagnostics,
genetic therapy) and human reproduction (IVF, surrogate mother-
hood). In this paper we will follow out the implications of these
two world views of germ-line engineering by discussing critically
a (admittedly subjective) selection of European opinions on this
topic.1 In Table I, we have categorized several European voices
(with a few others included for comparison) according to their
conclusion on two issues: somatic versus germ-line intervention,
gene therapy versus enhancement genetic engineering. Horizon-
tally, we distinguish: (i) refusal of any form of human gene
therapy; (ii) acceptance of somatic gene therapy only (the target of
the genetic modification must be restricted to the DNA of somatic
cells); (iii) some degree of acceptance of germ-line therapy (GLT;
this includes all DNA modifications that would be transmissible
to future persons, namely interventions on the DNA of gametes
and their precursors and also on the cells of early embryos where
the germ line has not yet segregated). Vertically, opinions are
categorized according to their acceptance of a therapeutic goal
only, (curing a medically defined disease entity in an individual
and possibly his or her descendants), or acceptance of an enhance-
ment goal as well (modifying the genome of individuals with a
view to providing them with capabilities or biological properties
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TABLE I
Genetic engineering on humans: Selection of opinions
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Misgivings against
all gene therapy
Approving somatic
gene therapy only
Not disapproving
germ-line therapy
Therapeutic goal
Guidelines
Benda Report 1986
NHMRC 1987
EMRC 1988
Amstad Report 1988
Council of Europe 1989
Fifth Inter. Summit 1988
Points to Consider 1989
Livre Blanc 1990
Council of Europe 1982
Analyses
Jonas 1985
Ruh 1989
Weatherall 1988
Pembrey 1988
Vogel 1989
OTA 1984
Walters 1986
Bayertz 1987
Anon. (Nature) 1988
Anderson 1989
Fowler 1989
Ameliorative
(enhancement)
goal
Analyses
Glover 1984
Engelhardt 1986
that go beyond the mere restoration of normal functions). A
further distinction was made according to 'literary genre7, viz.
normative statements of official bodies on one hand, individual
opinions and scholarly efforts on the other. Perusal of this table
reveals immediately the following points:
(a) There is a large consensus against the use of germ-line
engineering to 'improve' human beings either individually or
collectively. The minority view expressed by Glover (1984) seems
motivated mainly by a skepticism about the very concept of
'therapeutic' and more specifically, its delimitation from
'enhancement'. In this respect however, it is interesting to observe
that the European near-consensus agrees with the thinking of a
major American pioneer of gene therapy, W. French Anderson.
Over the years (Anderson, 1980, 1985, 1989, 1990), he moved to a
position where he asserts forcefully that GUT can be conceptually
and practically distinguished from enhancement germ-line
engineering and that the latter is indeed illegitimate.
(b) Statements with an obvious normative intent (such as those
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coming from official bodies) tend to exclude GLT as well as
enhancement engineering. They leave only somatic gene therapy
as an open option, recognizing its conceptual closeness to other
acceptable therapies such as grafts.
(c) Authors expressing personal views on the problem range all
the way from those who have serious misgivings about any use of
gene technology in the human sphere to a more or less guarded
acceptance for GLT.
Although enhancement germ-line engineering seems 'out7 for
the vast majority of European discussants, there is clearly more
uncertainty about using recombinant DNA techniques on the
germ line for bona fide therapeutic purposes. On one hand, the
therapeutic goal seems strong enough to legitimize GLT in
specific cases such as Huntington's disease, on the other its open-
ended character, its 'irreversibility' (an often used, but ambiguous
term), call for a reserved attitude or even an complete prohibition.
This hesitation can be traced through the pronouncements of the
Council of Europe, which is the only major political institution
that connects together all democratic countries in Europe and is
growing into an important ethico-legal authority. Its
Recommendation 934 (Council of Europe, 1982) suggested that
their should be a new article in the European Convention on
Human Rights guaranteeing "the right to inherit a genetic pattern
which has not been artificially changed" (R934,4i), but foresees
exceptions "in accordance with certain principles which are
recognised as being fully compatible with respect for human
rights (as, for example, in the field of therapeutic applications)".
We are not told what these principles are but they would seem to
allow GLT. Later on however, the Council of Europe came back
on the therapeutic exception in Recommendation 1100 and
declared expressly: "Any form of therapy on the human germinal
line shall be forbidden" (Council of Europe, 1989, appendix pt.18).
Therefore we will restrict our more detailed examination on
arguments pertaining to GLT, since this is clearly the most conten-
tious issue.
THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST GERM-LINE THERAPY ARE OF TWO KINDS
Arguments presented in opposition to GLT can be categorized in
two classes: those which are largely pragmatic, including argu-
ments pointing to an unfavorable balance of benefits versus risks,
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or more importantly, to the existence of alternative, more
palatable techniques that could achieve the same legitimate ends;
and those that can be termed ethical in a broad sense, including
appeals to basic human rights. By far the strongest pragmatic
argument against GLT is that selection of healthy embryos will
always be preferable to gene therapy of defective ones.2 The
possibility of correcting a deleterious mutation in embryos ob-
tained by in-vitro fertilization presupposes an ability to distin-
guish affected and healthy embryos from one another. As a matter
of fact, the latter ability is very much closer at hand than the
former (see Handyside, 1990). Since however, in any realistic
situation, there will always be some healthy embryos alongside
the defectives ones, there is literally nothing else left to do than to
transfer the healthy embryos in the prospective mother's womb.
The question of embryo therapy cannot arise. This has been
pointed out repeatedly by many participants in the GLT debate
(Pembrey, 1988; Weatherall, 1988; Vogel, 1989, pp.125-126;
Kaplan-Delpech, 1989, Chap.19).3
The strength of this argument seems to have been missed by
some ethicists. For instance, protestant theologian Hans Run
(1989) states that when dealing with GLT, prohibitions based on
pragmatic arguments will simply not do, because they have a way
of getting watered-down and eventually abandoned when the
progress of science goes past them. This may conceivably hold for
prohibitions that are linked explicitly to the current state of
scientific Knowledge (e.g., Mouvement Universel pour la Respon-
sabilite Scientifique (1989): "Given the current state of our
knowledge, the genetic endowment of man should not be
modified in a heritable manner", or risk-benefit considerations)
but misses the point of the above argument entirely. The impera-
tive it refers to, namely transferring healthy embryos and not
touching the others, is built into the very situation at hand. It
cannot be abolished by some unexpected biological discovery in
the way a running calculation of risk vs. benefit can suddenly be
upset by new scientific or technical knowledge. However, we
should point out that the core of Ruh's argument seems to be that
any pragmatic argument, by way of its very nature, falls short of
what is needed to defend mankind of what he feels to be the
unavoidably eugenic consequences of germ-line engineering. We
will come back to this issue later on.
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THE 'GENETIC PATRIMONY'
Arguing against germ-line engineering and GLT from a basic
human right to one's unmodified genetic endowment is a com-
monly adopted position in various European sources, such as
legal pronouncements (Council of Europe, 1982, 1989),
government-appointed committees (Benda, 1986; Amstad, 1989),
programmatic statements of non-official bodies (Mouvetnent
Universel pour la Responsabilite Scientifique, 1989) or scholarly
papers (Agius, 1989). It is probably not easy for a non-speaker of
French or German to feel how instinctively seductive an appeal to
the 'common genetic patrimony of mankind' can be. This is
because no English word conveys the same complexity of
meaning as the French patrimoine (or the German: Erbgut). Initially
it means the assets belonging to an individual, but with special
reference to the law of inheritance. In other words, patrimoine is
the sum-total of somebody's possessions, which he will bequeath
to his or her heirs. By a switch from the individual sphere to the
collective, the word has acquired a figurative sense which applies
especially to cultural matters. When hearing the expression: le
patrimoine culturel de Vhumanite, one thinks immediately of
cathedrals and Greek temples, of the Iliad and Hamlet, of UNESCO
and the campaign to save Venice. Thus the same concept points to
individual possessions, subjected to unlimited property-rights, ius
uti et abuti, and to the collective assets of a community (or of
mankind), all that is both irreplaceable and of enduring worth,
and therefore subject to specific forms of social protection. So far,
the English word 'heritage' is very similar. On the other hand,
however, the same word is used as in patrimoine ge'ne'tique to mean
something like an individual's genetic endowment. In fact, it is
used basically as a synonym of 'genetic material' or 'genome'.
This is especially so in popular writings about biology where it is
probably felt to be easier to understand then the correct special-
ized terms. Now it turns out that the same switch from the in-
dividual to the collective has probably occurred in this latter
context. From the notion of an individual genetic endowment,
which an autonomous subject might just possibly be allowed to
manipulate, one has moved to the idea of a collective genetic
heritage, whose unique worth is above any individual interest.
Just as an individual cannot tear down a Gothic chapel for his
private convenience, one cannot touch the 'genetic patrimony7,
even if some persons would benefit.
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We think that it is mainly for these purely semantic reasons that
the idea of an untouchable genetic endowment of mankind has
acquired the status of an obvious truth. Its superficial plausibility
has prevented its proponents from really arguing for it. One
conceivable foundation for it could be found in the ethic of Hans
Jonas, a thinker whom we will discuss again later because of his
major influence on bioethics in continental Europe. For Jonas,
mankind has an ontological responsibility toward the preserva-
tion of 'the image of man' and this responsibility is particularly
relevant to biomedical technology. If we were to accept that such
an imperative exists and if we assumed in addition that the
human genome - or rather such aspects of it as would be changed
by GLT - is central to the image of man, then (but only then) it
would follow that touching the human genome should be il-
legitimate in itself.
Another context in which the 'common patrimony7 theme
appears is in discussions about natural resources that should not
be privately or nationally appropriated, such as minerals on the
sea-bed (this is explicitly referred to by Agius), or 'germ-plasm',
i.e., the genetic resources represented by the large, but endan-
gered, diversity of plant species and varieties, especially in Third
World countries. There lie the roots of yet another confusion: it is
tempting to reason that, since germ-plasm is a common resource
subject to specific forms of social control, the same should apply
to the 'genetic patrimony of mankind'. But it is not at all clear in
what sense the human genome can be considered a 'resource'. In
fact, the utilitarian overtones of such an idea would seem rather
unfortunate, especially to those advocating the 'image-of-man'
style of bioethics.
ARE PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTS INHERENTLY FLAWED?
We have mentioned that Ruh, along with other philosophers and
theologians, is querying the pragmatic arguments as such. He
asks: "Is GLT to be rejected on categorical-ethical grounds or from
the point of view of our present knowledge"? Ruh thinks that we
must forswear GLT once and for all on a 'categorical-ethical' basis.
Otherwise the following slippery-slope scenario would develop:
Initially, there is a consensus that GLT is technically not feasible
and ethically uninteresting. Meanwhile however, scientists pursue
their basic research and explore somatic gene therapy. At one
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point, GLT becomes possible as well and a few people start to
practice it. It eventually becomes acceptable therapy and from
then on, one moves to the correction of minor defects and finally
to ameliorative genetic engineering and eugenics.
The 'gravity force' supposedly driving us down this slippery
slope is the therapeutic imperative, namely the possibility - and
therefore the obligation (principle of beneficence) - of alleviating
an individual's suffering. Ruh proposes to replace this in-
dividualistic and short-term criterion by what he calls species-
historical norms: They mandate that we ought to transmit to future
generations, (i) the capability to survive; (ii) the capability to live a
genuinely human life (with its ups and downs); (iii) the freedom
to choose and direct one's own destiny. 'Tampering' with the
genome would endanger these values and therefore Ruh claims
that to safeguard them, we need to move beyond prudential
considerations to a forceful, final, ethically-based prohibition of all
germ-line engineering including GLT and even to a' 'structural
inability7 to do research related to it.
Ruh appeals to three kinds of arguments, viz. the fragility of
pragmatic considerations, our responsibilities towards future
generations and the slippery slope driven by what we could call
the therapeutic 'excuse' for questionable feats of genetic engineer-
ing. All three arguments are problematic. We have already dis-
cussed the pragmatic preference of embryo selection over GLT.
Furthermore, it is hard to see why ethical arguments should have
inherently more force than prudential ones. Moral commands
derive their strength not from the solemnity with which they were
proclaimed once and for all, but from the renewed assent and
conviction of each generation of humans. As to the three values
(survival, humanity, freedom) that, for Ruh, encompass our duties
to future generations, they are not controversial. We certainly
have a duty to mind the consequences of our actions for the future
(non-maleficence). Yet the implications in the case at hand are far
from clear. Again one must stress, that it is not enhancement
engineering that is considered here but germ-line interventions
with a bona fide therapeutic purpose. After all, GLT merely aims at
restoring an order of things that obtained previously, but was
disturbed by genetic mutation. Unlike enhancement engineering,
it stays within the bounds of the traditional, restorative ethos of
medicine. Therefore, it is hard to see in what way GLT specifically
endangers the three long-term values quoted above. It would do
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so no more (and no less) than many developments in medicine
and therefore Ruh's argument lacks focus.
Ruh is quite right in pointing to our duties to future generations
as relevant to the problem of GLT. However, without further
clarification, such duties could be deeply ambiguous. In fact, had
they known about genetic engineering, some of the 'progressive'
eugenists of the nineteen-thirties (e.g., Hermann J. Muller or Julian
Huxley), would probably have claimed that we owe it to future
generations to fix their genes! We all agree that we have a respon-
sibility towards the future but are divided over the means of
fulfilling it. One of the dividing factors is the world-view implied
by the slippery-slope argument. By conjuring up a technological
scenery made of a maze of slippery slopes, inextricably weaving
together the Good, the Bad and the Horrible, proponents of this
view have painted themselves into a corner: While wanting us to
resist the encroachments of genetic engineering, they have under-
mined the very basis for such a resistance, viz. the ability to set
limits. We must avoid the slippery slope, but whatever we do, we
are already on it....
As B. Williams noted (1986), the slippery-slope argument is not
always a bad one but in those cases where it is logically sound, it
must refer back to supportive empirical data. But this is precisely
the kind of information that users of the argument usually feel
excused from providing. For instance, Ruh sets great store by the
slippery-slope argument as applied to the transition from somatic
to germ-line therapy, and from GLT to enhancement engineering
and eugenics. The idea that developing somatic gene therapy
eventually will make GLT irresistible comes from the early
literature on the subject (Walters, 1986). The argument runs as
follows: once we have corrected the 'bad' gene into the 'good' one
in a given tissue, why not fix the problem once and for all by
making a similar correction in the germ-line? But this is not the
direction in which the field has actually moved. From this initial
understanding of the procedure, which we have called
"orthogenic" (Mauron, 1990, unpublished conference), one has
moved to the grafting analogy, the exogenous DNA being con-
strued as a kind of 'naked' graft. Thereafter, interest has moved
(partly at least) from the transformation of long-lived stem cells to
more ephemeral, yet more accessible, cell types such as lym-
phocytes and endothelial cells. Another promising paradigm for
the future seems to be the organoid system, a kind of composite
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graft including both artificial polymers and living, genetically
engineered cells that provide the body with a missing substance,
somewhat like an implantable pump (Culliton, 1990). If this
promise materializes, somatic gene therapy would have moved
from an orthogenic to a chemotherapeutic metaphor, its aim from
correcting a genetic defect to compensating for it. Furthermore, the
indication for such a therapy need no longer be a genetic disease
strictly speaking: AIDS, cancer, emphysema are all now being
considered candidates for this 'genetic' therapy. A similar shift of
emphasis would attend to procedures eventually derived from
other recent experimental findings, for instance that direct injec-
tion of DNA into muscles of mice leads to the synthesis of the
appropriate protein for several months (Wolff, 1990). This form of
treatment would no longer be recognizably genetic, except in the
trivial sense that DNA plays a role in it. As a consequence, the
slippery slope towards GLT is simply not there.
The slippery slope from GLT to eugenics is much harder to
evaluate. For one thing, the recent evolution of the GLT concept
has, if anything, increased our doubts that such a therapy can ever
become a conceptually sound proposition. Now as regards
eugenics, the word is all too often used rhetorically to cast a pall of
obloquy over any aspect of human genetics that the writer hap-
pens to dislike. Nevertheless, we agree that the issue of eugenics
must be raised in this context. We mentioned embryo selection as
the realistic alternative to GLT. The possible eugenic implications
of this procedure certainly exist (selection of sex and other
'desirable' characteristics, as opposed to prevention of major
genetic pathology), but they are not really different than those of
prenatal diagnosis in general. Likewise, the potential of embryo
selection for ameliorative engineering is limited: all embryos
subjected to the selection would be possible 'natural' offspring of
their parents. Defending society from eugenic abuses of both
embryo selection and prenatal diagnosis implies similar
procedural steps in both cases, for instance reinforcing the patient-
centered ethos of clinical genetics.
If one looks at the history of bioethical issues, the slippery slope
really looks more like a ramshackle staircase: once in a while, we
trip down a few steps. This makes us wake up, take stock of
ethical shortcomings and climb up the stairs by appropriate
measures such as societal regulation. An example of this process
would be the setting up of Institutional Review Boards to oversee
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medical research with human subjects after the aberrant research
practices at Tuskegee and Willowbrook had been exposed. In fact,
it is not even always necessary to fall down the stairs before
climbing up again, as the history of recombinant DNA regulation
proves.
THE JONASSIAN POSITION
We chose to focus on the 'pessimistic' view of human genetics as
expressed by Ruh, but could have discussed other writers from a
significant group who show the pervasive influence of
philosopher Hans Jonas. His thought is relevant not just to
bioethics but to many discussions about the ills of our technologi-
cal society. For Jonas and his followers, modern science and
technology have created a completely new ethical situation, in
which the reflective tools provided by the various ethical tradi-
tions are found wanting (Jonas, 1979,1985). For one thing, modern
technoscience has now become so powerful that it has given
mankind a truly global leverage on this planet and its future. The
reach of technoscience is now universal: the consequences of
technoscientific choices stretch far and forcefully into space and
time and mankind's responsibility has increased accordingly.
Furthermore, Jonas thinks that good and bad effects of techno-
science are increasingly linked together. In addition, Jonas is a
firm believer in the technological imperative: there is no distance
left between the mere possession of a new capability and its actual
use. Novel technologies have a way of moving automatically from
laboratory experiment to all-out, large scale implementation,
ynwittingly, we let them reach the 'critical mass' where they
escape our control. All this means that the 'old' ways of evaluat-
ing technoscience (e.g., cost-benefit analysis, sorting out good
from bad consequences) are no longer up to the task. In their
stead, a new ethical principle is necessary, viz. 'the predominance
of negative prediction'. Faced with a technoscientific novelty, we
must exercise our imagination to determine all thinkable effects,
good or evil, and if there are any in the latter category, then we
must utterly renounce this technology. A catastrophic conse-
quence, if it is merely thinkable, and no matter how minuscule its
probability, must be absolutely overriding.
Jonas is right in calling attention to prospective thinking as a
duty of scientists and technologists. But the overridingness of bad
660 Alex Mauron and Jean-Marie Thevoz
consequences is utterly unworkable as an actual guide for action,
as pointed out by critics such as Bockle (1988) and Sass (1987,
1988). The underlying assumption is that, in the face of technos-
cientific novelty, innocence lies in abstention. This is certainly
wrong as an a priori principle: a moratorium or a final stop to a
given line of research is not per se moral. For instance, let us
imagine that the Asilomar conference, rather than replacing the
Berg Moratorium by a procedural framework (Watson and Tooze,
1981), had decreed an irrevocable ban on all recombinant DNA
research. We wager that our knowledge about the HIV virus
would be far less advanced than it is. It is even doubtful that the
agent of AIDS should have been identified and usable diagnostic
procedures established: however much we suffer from our present
impotence before AIDS, it would have been far worse still and we
would have been prevented from even taking stock of the
epidemic. Would we say then that the generation of 1975 had
discharged its responsibility towards the generation of 1990?
GERM-LINE THERAPY AND AUTONOMY
In the European bioethical debate, one can often observe a certain
distrust of autonomy-based arguments, based on an impression
that they lead to a very 'laissez-faire' position such as that ex-
emplified by Engelhardt (1986, 1987). That this is not necessarily
so was extensively shown by Bayertz (1987). If we refuse
heteronomous rules for ourselves and claim the right to draw our
life-plan autonomously, we can hardly fail to grant the same
breathing-space to others, including future others. In a way, this is
not unlike Ruh's species-historical norms, that could be under-
stood as the respect for the autonomous life-plans of future
generations. In his book GenEthik (Chap. 14), Bayertz shows clearly
that this reciprocal character of autonomy4 precludes enhance-
ment germ-line engineering, since it should make us refuse
genetic modifications that impose on future human beings a
specific view of the good life. Does this argument preclude GLT as
well? Bayertz, an articulate critic of the jonassian tradition, thinks
that it does not. For instance, it is hard to see why parents could
not make legitimate proxy decisions about therapy on behalf of
their embryos just as they do for a newborn child. But when the
beneficiaries of GLT are more remote - as is the case when GLT is
presented as the definitive 'genetic fix' as opposed to the
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restricted scope of somatic therapy or embryo selection - then the
issue of autonomy warrants a second look.
We should assess GLT as a particular instance of intergenera-
tional relationship and responsibility, as Ruh suggests. To be sure,
the very idea of having duties to future generations as far as
genetics is concerned can be double-edged, as we have discussed
before. However, we are now in a position to reformulate the
intergenerational questions as follows: do we want (or ought) to
become doctors to future, not-yet-conceived persons, who would,
generation after generation, be the indirect recipients of our
benevolent genetic ministrations? It could be argued that we are,
and have been for some time, doctors of the future. As has been
pointed out often, many health-related practices (whether or not
they come within the purview of medicine proper) change the
genetic fitness of specific genotypes and therefore influence their
frequency in the population (see, e.g., Vogel and Motulsky, 1986,
pp. 448-449). That such changes are ultimately unpredictable
should be obvious. After all, many of our actions lie at the start of
causal chains whose ends are 'out of sight' and therefore can be
considered unpredictable and also irreversible in some sense.
Towards our own nature as towards nature at large, we simply
cannot act on the principle: "Please leave this place the same as
you found it". This is the reason why the mere appeal to inter-
generational liability, without further qualification, is a feeble
argument against GLT. Now the fact that some degree of genetic
'tinkering' is unavoidably blended into many actions that are
ethically unobjectionable does not automatically legitimize a
willful, targeted modification of future genomes (Jonas, 1985,
pp. 282-283). We would still have to decide whether we would
want to place future people's genes explicitly within the reach of
our current medical powers. This is where we are inclined to say
no: Germ-line therapy means in effect curing 'tomorrow's' people
with 'today's' techniques and, more importantly, 'today's' concep-
tual tools (the quotes indicate that we are referring, as always in
this paper, to some presumed future time in which germ-line
therapy would be a workable proposition). But our ideas about
genetic medicine will probably be looked upon as rudimentary
and simplistic by future geneticists. Just as ameliorative germ-line
engineering absolutizes particular, historically contingent
preferences (Bayertz, 1989, Chap.13), we suggest that GLT may
well give an excessive lasting power to a contingent state of
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medical science. In this respect, the eugenic policies of yesteryear
and especially the more or less 'well-meaning' ones that were
implemented in many democratic countries in the twenties and
thirties should give us ample cause for embarrassment. They
should make us skeptical that any of our projects for benefitting
the future genetic constitution of mankind can hold water in the
very long term.
CONCLUSIONS
Whether GLT will ever make sense in the future is far from
obvious. Should this eventually be the case, we think that the onus
would be on proponents of GLT to show that it is pragmatically
preferable to diagnostic techniques such as, for instance, embryo
selection. Furthermore, when evaluating technologies such as
germ-line therapy that reach far into the future, we have to ask
whether we could be placing a significant burden onto future
generations by forcing them to take care of problems linked to our
way of looking at a specific issue, especially if it includes a great
deal of speculation. This emphasizes the essential role of the
client-centered ethos typical of current medical genetics and
discussed in relation with GLT by Fowler et ah (1989). According
to this view, the proper concern of clinical genetics is to heal
patients and, after a fashion, their immediate offspring. It does not
and should not encompass future generations generally and even
less 'cure the gene pool'. This deontological attitude provides a
useful model for how medicine can keep its sphere of action
technically and morally manageable. For ultimately, it would not
be sustainable for medicine itself to have the sphere of its respon-
sibility expand indefinitely in space and time.
In the European bioethical debate, proponents of the
'pessimistic' point of view, exemplified by Jonas, play a useful
role in calling our attention to three important points. Firstly,
there is the duty of scientists to use prospective thinking.
Secondly, they never tire to remind us that a medical procedure is
not necessarily ethical just because it has a therapeutic purpose.
Finally, they point to intergenerational responsibility as an impor-
tant component of several bioethical problems, although, as we
have seen, a great deal of conceptual clarification remains to be
done in this respect. The reason why this 'defensive ethic', as it is
called by Sass (1987), fails in the end to provide a workable guide
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for action is due to an inadequate underlying philosophy of
technology (the technological imperative, the inherent evil of
'reductionism') but also the fact that its arguments against con-
troversial genetic procedures such as GLT are unfocused. Often,
they seem to be really directed against ameliorative manipulations
or else they could apply, in a naturalistic vein, against many other
medical practices and many technologies in general, new or old.
Rarely do the specifics of GLT seem to be clearly addressed. This
lack of focus, together with a liberal use of the slippery-slope
argument, leads to an inflationary process of advocating more and
more sweeping prohibitions. Although Jonas himself seems
occasionally to recoil from explicitly anti-science conclusions
(Jonas 1985, p. 317), this is not always the case of his followers.5
This is where some degree of 'optimism' has to step in, with its
guarded confidence in the ability of human society to make
responsible choices, if bioethics is not to retreat into a posture of
sullen impotence.6
NOTES
1
 The listed papers might strike the reader as a motley collection far exceeding
the limits of 'scholarly opinion'. This is because the bioethical debate in Europe is
rather different from the prevailing situation in North America. Firstly, bioethics
has been recognized as a distinct scholarly endeavour, separate from medical
deontology, only very recently. Furthermore, Europe has discovered bioethics
mainly through the problems raised by reproductive medicine (rather than
genetics or human experimentation). That was the topic that led to the creation of
the Warnock (UK), Benda (Germany) and Amstad (Switzerland) committees and
dominated the initial work of the French Comite Consultatif National d'Ethique.
Finally, there is no clear-cut division of work between individuals contributing
analytical papers aiming mostly at conceptual clarification and committees and
collectives of various kinds providing normative statements. The consequence is
that there is one large, lively but slightly confusing bioethical debate, to which
scholars, government-appointed bodies, churches, international organizations,
single-issue lobbies, learned societies, informal reflexion groups at universities
and health-care facilities all contribute something.
2
 We are assuming here that if and when GLT moves closer to the realm of
possibility, this will happen in the context of an in vitro procedure performed on
embryos or unfertilized eggs, followed by embryo transfer. The transformation
of sperm with exogenous DNA that stirred the interest of the biological com-
munity in 1989 is now widely recognized as having "run into sand" (Maddox,
1989) and the possibility of vectors homing in specifically on an individual's
primordial germ cells brings us a few steps further into science fiction as
compared to 'embryo-based' scenarios.
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3
 Of course, we are not asserting that embryo selection is itself devoid of ethical
problems. In fact, we are not convinced that it is the panacea that it is sometimes
touted to be, i.e., an obviously superior alternative to current prenatal-diagnostic
techniques (Thevoz, 1990). But a discussion of the many ethical and health-policy
issues linked with it would be beyond the scope of this paper.
4
 A kindred view, emphasizing the interplay of autonomy and otherness can be
found in the work of the Belgian philosopher Malherbe, although he starts from
very different philosophical assumptions (Malherbe, 1987).
5
 See for instance Eibach (1990), who feels that gathering extensive knowledge
about the human genome is unethical.
6
 This paper is part of the Ethics and Genetics Project at the Louis Jeantet
Foundation for Medicine, Geneva, Switzerland.
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